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NOTE
DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL
REPORTING
Pulitzer prizewinning journalist Seymour Hersh currently is being
sued for libel1 by a former official of Indira Ghandi's cabinet whom
Hersh describes as an operative for the Central Intelligence Agency in his
book, The Price of Power.2 The Indian politician seeks disclosure of the
identities of confidential sources who supplied Hersh with information
concerning the Nixon administration's role in the 1971 conflict between
India and Pakistan. Like most libel plaintiffs, the politician claims that he
must know the identity of each of the sources to prove that the informa-
tion was published with actual malice. Journalist-defendants, on the
other hand, generally contend that source identity should be protected
because that information is not needed to prove libel and, even if it is, the
newsgathering function of journalists deserves great protection under the
first amendment.3 The legal result of Hersh's refusal to reveal the iden-
tity of his sources, depending on the jurisdiction, could be jail, a default
judgment entered against him, or other court measures which would af-
fect the outcome of the trial.4
Courtroom controversies involving requests for disclosure of such
sensitive information highlight the tension between the exercise of first
amendment rights by journalists and the interests of libel plaintiffs in
protecting their reputations. In another recent libel suit involving a for-
eign official and a media defendant, the Israeli Minister of Industry and
Trade, Ariel Sharon, sued Time, Inc. as a result of a story implicating
1. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983, § 1, at 5, col. 4.
2. S. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER 444-64 (1983). Hersh depicts libel plaintiff Moraji R.
Desai as a paid informant for the CIA involved with the Nixon administration during the 1971
conflict between India and Pakistan. See id. at 459-60.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 26-62.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 62-74.
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Sharon in the 1982 massacre of hundreds of Palestinians in refugee
camps in West Beirut. Sharon called the story a "blood libel"' and sued
for fifty million dollars The reporter-defendant attributed his story par-
tially to a classified report by an Israeli investigating commission and
relied on confidential sources for the information allegedly contained in
the report's secret appendix.7 At trial, Time lost on the falsity issue of
the libel charge, but subsequently prevailed because Sharon could not
prove that Time had known the story to be false.' This case exemplifies
the controversy surrounding confidential sources in libel suits.9
Courts need guidelines for examining the materiality of libel plain-
tiffs' disclosure demands, as well as for screening journalists' assertions of
the need for secrecy to preserve first amendment interests. The balancing
test currently used by the federal courts to evaluate disclosure claims in
libel suits is applied in an arbitrary and conclusory manner. Courts have
failed to articulate when disclosure is mandated in a specific context.
The result is a variety of outcomes in civil libel suits without adequate
analysis of the competing interests. The balancing test as currently imple-
mented does not allow libel plaintiffs, journalists, or potential sources the
certainty necessary to adequately assess their risks before a suit is filed, a
story is reported, or a confidential relationship is established.10
5. See R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PREss 82 (1986).
6. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Dworkin, The Press on
Trial, New York Review of Books, Feb. 26, 1987, at 29, col. 1 (reviewing R. ADLER, infra note 7).
For an interesting proposal about the confidential source issue and discouraging such litigation, see
id. at 36-37.
7. See, e.g., R. ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD 62-69 (1986).
8. Kelly, Wrestling with Defamation and Truth, TIME, Jan. 28, 1985, at 62-63.
9. See R. ADLER, supra note 7, at 23. "So the entire edifice of Time in this case was poised
upon a single reporter, claiming to have access to unnamed sources, who in turn had access to official
documents, which would remain forever secret, and which supported Time's paragraph-or else did
not." For a different perspective of the value of confidential sources, see R. Dworkin, supra note 6,
at 30, col. 4:
Though the use of confidential sources has proved ... to be a valuable, perhaps even
indispensable, means of uncovering official deceit, Sharon does show that editors must be
particularly vigilant in supervising it. So long as the practice continues to be accepted by
American journalists ... it does not trivialize the First Amendment... for a journal not to
retract what it still honestly believes its reporter learned from such a source, just because
the story has been denied or because it has been sued.
10. See R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, THE FARBER CASE: REPORTERS AND IN-
FORMERS 377 (1985).
So even now reporters cannot, or should not, flatly promise an informer confidentiality.
Any such promise must be qualified, if the reporter is scrupulous, by the statement that
under certain circumstances, not entirely defined by previous court decisions, and impossible
to predict in advance, a court may legally compel disclosure.
Id (emphasis added).
DISCLOSURE OF SOURCES
This Note will suggest a better test and demonstrate its application
by analyzing the proper scope of protection for confidential sources in
the international news context. This Note will show that the uncertainty
of the current test is particularly grievous in the context of libel litigation
because of the likelihood of harm to sources and the potential that arbi-
trary disclosure orders have for inhibiting the flow of international news
to the public.
At the outset, this Note will examine the conflicting interests which
arise when a person demands source disclosure, summarize the method
now used by most courts when libel plaintiffs request disclosure, and
then show why the balancing test currently employed to administer the
qualified federal privilege is acutely inadequate. In the second Part, this
Note will explore concerns about source disclosure in the international
news context, following the lead of the United States Supreme Court in
upholding a disclosure order only after a thorough analysis of the com-
peting interests at stake in the grand jury context. 1' Finally, this Note
will suggest a more effective method of analysis which could be applied
as the qualified privilege is administered in other contexts.
I. THE SCOPE OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE PROTECTION
IN CIVIL LIBEL SUITS
A. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING REQUESTS FOR DISCLOSURE
Libel plaintiffs often request the identity of confidential sources or
access to unpublished information to prove that the defendant published
the allegedly defamatory information with knowledge that the source
was unreliable, or that contradictory reports existed which the journalist
chose not to use. 12 Many plaintiffs claim that such information is essen-
tial to meet the burden of proof established in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 3 In Sullivan, the Supreme Court created a qualified constitu-
tional privilege for "those who would give voice to public criticism.""
The Court held in Sullivan that the first amendment protects per-
sons who unintentionally supply false information to the public. If all
such errors were punished, the Court reasoned, the truth would be sup-
pressed."5 To minimize self-censorship and maintain the flow of infor-
mation in society, the Court held that to prove that a statement is
11. See infra text accompanying notes 75-102.
12. For further discussion see infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. Id. at 278.
15. Id. at 279.
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libelous, public officials and public figures must show that a defendant
published false and defamatory information with "actual malice," which
is defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information.1 6 In contrast, a plaintiff who is not a public
official or a public figure carries a lesser burden of proof, only having to
prove falsity and negligence, rather than actual malice. 7 This Note will
focus on litigation involving the actual malice standard, since it is pre-
sumed that those who claim that their reputational interests are damaged
by journalists are often public officials.
1. The Need for Disclosure of Confidential Sources to Meet
Burdens of Proof
A libel plaintiff can prove that the defendant published with actual
malice by obtaining direct evidence, such as the defendant's statements
about the editorial judgment used in preparing the information for publi-
cation, or through indirect evidence, such as the circumstances surround-
ing the publication.'" A plaintiff also may prove that the defendant had a
culpable state of mind by showing "that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,"' 9 or that the defendant
had "subjective awareness of probable falsity."20 Probable falsity may be
found if "there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant
or the accuracy of the source's reports."'"
A defendant can prevail by showing that the information is true,
that it is not defamatory, or by refuting the charge of actual malice,
through, for example, uncontradicted evidence of careful investigation.22
16. Id. at 279-80.
17. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (the heightened state interest in protect-
ing the reputations of private individuals who do not have the same ease of access to the media as
public figures held to require a lesser burden of proof).
18. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979).
19. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
20. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335 n.6 (construing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 727).
21. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732 (plaintiff able to show the source's statement "inherently im-
probable"). A plaintiff can prove malice or negligence by establishing that the journalist possessed a
document contradicting the information given by the source. Also, obvious reason for doubt could
be shown if nonconfidential sources gave the journalist accounts different from that of the confiden-
tial source. Gleichenhaus v. Carlyle, 226 Kan. 167, 169, 598 P.2d 611, 613 (1979). Malice or negli-
gence might also be shown if defendant failed to contact the plaintiff for his or her side of the story
after obtaining damaging information from a confidential source. Akins v. Altus Newspapers, Inc.,
609 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Okla. 1977), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980). Plaintiff may prevail if defend-
ant contacted the plaintiff and failed to include those remarks in the article. Holter v. WLCY T.V.,
Inc., 336 So.2d 445, 448-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), reh'g denied, 373 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1979).
22. Cervantes v.Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
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The question of liability, however, is always open to subjective interpreta-
tion; the judge and jury are given a great deal of discretion in deciding if
a defendant knew or should have known. The Supreme Court only re-
cently clarified that the plaintiff has the burden of presenting clear and
convincing evidence to meet the actual malice standard when a defend-
ant files a motion for summary judgment.23 Such decisions are difficult
when a journalist maintains that secrecy is necessary or that the identities
of the sources are not relevant to proof of actual malice, while a plaintiff
claims that the malice issue depends on disclosure of potentially biased or
unreliable sources.24
A libel plaintiff will usually maintain that the identities of all sources
are relevant evidence toward meeting the burden of proof required under
the actual malice standard. A plaintiff thus has an interest in requesting
broad discovery in order to obtain any information which might impli-
cate the defendant's state of mind. If a plaintiff can implicate the credibil-
ity of a source by showing that the source was unreliable or had a
particular grievance against the plaintiff, it is easier to prove that the
defendant should have known of the falsity of the information.
A libel plaintiff's lawyer also may request such disclosure in an ef-
fort to zealously defend a client and to avoid the possibility of a future
malpractice suit. The lawyer might also have strategic reasons for re-
questing disclosure of all confidential sources and information as well; if
the client loses, the denial of the requested evidence can be brought up as
an issue on appeal.25
2. Need for Protection of Confidential Sources
a. Relevancy: a reporter may refuse to disclose confidential
sources because the identity of the source is not relevant to the plaintiff's
claim. Courts have clearly shown that the journalist's liability does not
hinge on the motives of the source2 6 and some courts maintain that the
23. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
24. See, e.g., R. ADLER, supra note 7, at 22-23.
25. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 378-79. In discussing In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 272,
394 A.2d 330, 336, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978), Dworkin notes: "[lit has been suggested that
Brown [the lawyer seeking disclosure of journalist's notes] made his request not because he believed
he would discover anything useful to his client, but because he hoped the request would be refused,
so that he could later claim, on appeal, that the trial was unfair."
26. See, eg., Alioto v. Cowles Communication, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (a
journalist's culpability held not to be based on a source's "impure" motives but on whether the
journalist took steps to verify the information gleaned from sources with such motives. If the defend-
ant failed to obtain independent verification for such suspicious information, this fact alone might
show actual malice); see also Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970)
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identity of a source is irrelevant to the question of malice.27 In particular
instances, if a source is the sole eyewitness to an event or has knowledge
of politically oriented crimes, such information might be vital in a legal
proceeding.2" In most libel suits, though, the identity of the source is not
crucial.29 In many circumstances, however, with the subjectivity of the
actual malice standard, the reliability of the source may remain a crucial
issue.
b. Retaliation and potential chilling effects: the journalist may re-
fuse to disclose the source's identity for fear that the individual source
will be subject to retaliation from the plaintiff. The journalist may refuse
to reveal the source, which would entail breaking a promise of confidenti-
ality, because this source and others with sensitive information will be
deterred from giving the journalist such information in the future. Courts
have stated that compelling journalists to breach a confidence merely be-
cause a libel suit has been filed against them "would seem inevitably to
lead to an excessive restraint on the scope of legitimate newsgathering
activity."3 Journalists contend that compulsory disclosure would cause
particular sources to dry up as well as deter other persons from giving
information to the press.
c. Public demand for information: journalists regularly rely on
confidential sources for a significant amount of the information they dis-
tribute to the public; one survey estimates that amount to be thirty per-
cent.31 Even well respected publications like the Wall Street Journal use
confidential sources regularly.32 Newspapers, news magazines, and na-
tional television network programs have become more reliant on confi-
dential sources in recent decades for several reasons. In part, these
journalists have turned to more investigative, analytical reporting be-
cause of the dominance of daily television news programs. The public
(spite, hostility, or deliberate intention to harm irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant knew
the information was false or doubted its truth).
27. See, eg., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (lst Cir. 1980);
Senear v. Daily J. Am., 27 Wash. App. 454, 473, 618 P.2d 536, 546 (1980).
28. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 276 (1971).
29. Id
30. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, at 993 n.10 (8th Cir. 1972); Riley v. Chester, 612
F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 966 (1973) ("Compelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens a journal-
ist's ability to secure information that is made available to him only on a confidential basis.").
31. Blasi, supra note 28, at 247.
32. Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64
Nw. U.L. Rv. 18, 57-61 (1969) (annually approximately 15% of the Journal's stories used confi-
dential sources).
1636
DISCLOSURE OF SOURCES
relies on television for the headline news and many readers demand more
in-depth coverage from newspapers and magazines.3 3
Sources are used primarily for assessment, interpretation, and verifi-
cation.34 Other uses include: quotes about nonpublic material; confirma-
tion of unpublished material; "fact dropping" (using information from
one source to gain "on-the-record" information from other persons); ad-
vice on which parts of the story to emphasize; persuading editors about
the credibility of a story; and providing readers with alternative views to
public reports or official positions.35 Reporters often base stories on infer-
ences from confidential sources who are reluctant to provide more direct
leads, as evidenced by the techniques used in the Washington Post's re-
porting on the Watergate cover-up.36
Journalists in one survey said they rely more on confidential sources
for certain types of stories. Journalists tend to rely on these sources (in
order of frequency) when covering the government, investigative stories,
financial stories, radical or militant groups, and trials more than in other
stories.37 Use of confidential sources has become widespread-particu-
larly for investigative stories.38 This is necessitated partially by the judg-
ments required in some complex types of reporting-when only
competing versions of the truth exist and journalists seek to provide the
best available subjective judgments.39
Journalists are aware of the dangers of compromising fairness and
neutrality when relying on confidential sources and avoid close identifica-
tion with the source or failure to be aggressive enough with the source.4'
Editors are involved with the confidential source decisions and often
know the identities of sources. This practice is more common for very
trusted, experienced reporters.41 However, at least one highly respected
journalist, I.F. Stone, published "investigative" reports without using
any "off-the-record" information.42
33. Blasi, supra note 28, at 234, 249-50.
34. Id. at 284.
35. MaL at 245-46.
36. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 30, col. 3 (discussing comments of Time's Editor-in-Chief,
Henry Grunwald).
37. Blasi, supra note 28, at 251-52.
38. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 30, col. 2.
39. R. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 194 (discussing statements of Washington Post reporter Bob
Woodward).
40. Blasi, supra note 28, at 241-45.
41. Id. at 244, 248.
42. Id. at 248-49; R. ADLER, supra note 7, at 22.
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No conclusive data exists to verify that sources will dry up or to
establish that sources would continue to be willing to supply journalists
with sensitive information in the absence of a privilege against disclosure.
The Supreme Court has stated that the relationship between journalists
and their sources is "symbiotic" and that sources would not necessarily
dry up completely, even if no privilege were afforded to the relation-
ship.43 It is logical to suppose, however, that many who request confi-
dentiality out of fear for their security or safety would refuse to speak to
the press.' The impossibility of obtaining empirical proof of sources
drying up compounds the problem (you cannot measure what informa-
tion a source is withholding if you do not know what information exists
or how much the source knows). The reluctance of sources to provide
information is often a subtle phenomenon, difficult for a reporter to link
to particular legal rules.45
d. Chilling effects: journalists say that the mere threat of subpoe-
nas interferes with their ability to report effectively, causing sources to
refuse to grant information, delay in confirming reports, and a guarded-
ness in both sources and journalists. But it is difficult to assess this self-
reported chilling effect. "Drying up" can also occur for other reasons.
For example, if a source is dissatisfied with the journalist's use of the
information supplied or if other factors change, the amount of informa-
tion a source is willing to give may diminish. 46 A source will often supply
information in varying amounts during the course of a long-term rela-
tionship with a particular reporter. 47 One commentator describes the
phenomenon of source reluctance to supply information because of a sub-
poena threat as a "poisoning of the atmosphere" rather than a complete
"drying up."548
It is helpful to analyze specific incidents when sources have refused
to give information to journalists or refused to be taped directly because
of the threat of being subpoenaed later. Journalists specifically cite such
43. Branzburg v. United States, 408 U.S. 665, 594 (1972).
44. See Note, Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv.
1450, 1475-76 (1985). o
45. See, ,g., BLASi, supra note 28, at 266-70.
46. Id at 266-67.
47. For example, David Halevy, the Time reporter involved in the Sharon case, supra notes 5-
8, had cultivated valuable sources in the Israeli government and military. He had been a military
officer and remained a lieutenant colonel in the reserve, maintaining these relationships and using his
sources for many accurate stories. He had filed one prior false report, for which he had been disci-
plined by Time editors. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 29, col. 1.
48. Blasi, supra note 28, at 284.
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interference in stories concerning a bank failure, court corruption investi-
gations in Chicago, draft dodgers in Canada, activities within federal
prisons, Black Panther demonstrations at Yale University, anti-war dem-
onstrations in Washington, and drug-related activities.4 9 These might be
the types of sources the Supreme Court had in mind when it noted that
some sources have legitimate reasons to fear disclosure; or the type of
information which the Court thought the public had an interest in receiv-
ing. 0 Although exact measurements of a chilling effect are impossible,
courts can consider the probability of future deterrence by a closer exam-
ination of the type of source and type of information supplied.5 1
e. Historical traditions: journalists have a long tradition of protect-
ing their confidential sources, even when a refusal to reveal a source's
identity has kept them in jail.52 Even Benjamin Franklin was questioned
about confidential sources for an article which offended certain politi-
cians.5 3 Journalists zealously defend this ability to protect sources who
request confidentiality as an integral part of a free press.54 A source may
49. Id
50. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 93-98.
52. In 1734, New York journalist John Peter Zenger was jailed for allegedly libeling a colonial
governor. Zenger declined to reveal the sources of his information. After nine months in jail,
Zenger was tried and acquitted. M. VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS
5-6 (1979). In 1848, the United States Senate held a reporter from the New York Herald in contempt
and arrested him after he refused to reveal his source for a copy of a secret treaty proposing to end
the Mexican-American War. The journalist remained in jail, failing to secure a writ of habeas
corpus. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F.Cas. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1848) (No. 10,375). In this century, the late
William Farr, a reporter for the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, spent 46 days in jail because he
refused to reveal the source for a copy of a deposition in the Charles Manson murder trial. Farr v.
Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
53. See Blasi, supra note 28, at 229 n.l.
One of the Pieces in our News-Paper, on some political Point which I have now forgotten,
gave Offence to the Assembly. He was taken up, censur'd and imprison'd for a month by
the Speaker's Warrant, I suppose because he would not discover his Author. I too was
taken up and examin'd before the Council; but tho' I did not give them any Satisfaction,
they contend themselves with admonishing me, and dismiss'd me; considering me perhaps
as an Apprentice who was bound to keep his Master's Secret.
Id (quoting THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 69 (YALE UNIV. PRESS 1964)).
54. Without an unfettered press, citizens would be far less able to make informed political,
social, and economic choices. But the press' function as a vital source of information is
weakened whenever the ability of journalists to gather news is impaired. Compelling a
reporter to disclose the identity of a source may significantly interfere with this news-
gathering ability; journalists frequently depend on informants to gather news, and confi-
dentiality is often essential to establishing a relationship with an informant.
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Blasi, supra note 28, at 284.
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be unwilling to supply information on certain matters without an assur-
ance of confidentiality, especially if the source is vulnerable to retalia-
tion.55 Even in the United States, vulnerable sources such as employees
who provide information about government corruption,56 persons who
supply information about organized crime, or those who investigate un-
ethical activities can be subject to harm.57
Forced disclosure is likely to discourage sources who particularly
need confidentiality from imparting vital information to the public via
the press. 8 Few can forget the importance of the confidential source
"Deep Throat" to the Washington Post's investigation of the Watergate
cover-up.5 9 The threat to the individual sources and its potential effect
on the public was especially notable when the identities of sources with
information about the Watergate burglary were requested in Democratic
National Committee v. McCord.' The court denied disclosure, saying
that it "cannot blind itself to the possible 'chilling effect' the enforcement
of these broad subpoenas would have on the flow of information to the
press, and so to the public."6
55. "Such informants... may fear that disclosure will threaten their job security or personal
safety or that it will simply result in dishonor or embarrassment." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 693 (1972).
56. "The news media rely upon confidential sources in the preparation of many stories, partic-
ularly those involving government or large organizations." Sierra Life Ins. Co v. Magic Valley
Newspapers, Inc., 4 MEDIA L. REP. 1689, 1773 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1978), rev'd, 6 MEDIA L. REP.1769
(Idaho 1980). The president and general manager of the Associated Press estimated that one-third of
the important stories from Washington would not surface without anonymous sources. Comment,
The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 UCLA L. REv.
160, 174 n.74 (1976).
57. One reporter was murdered while investigating Arizona land fraud and the influence of
organized crime in Phoenix. Jennings, Quill, July-Aug. 1976, at 13. A group of investigative report-
ers and editors later continued the investigation of organized crime and their material used confiden-
tial sources extensively. This information led to further investigation by a grand jury. Bondarook,
Quill, Mar. 1977, at 13.
58. Compelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens a journalist's
ability to secure information that is made available to him only on a confidential basis ....
The deterrent effect such disclosure is likely to have upon future undercover investigative
reporting ... threatens freedom of the press and the public's need to be informed.
Baker v. F. & F. Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 996 (1972).
59. C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 73-75 (1974).
60. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
61. Id at 1397; see also Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D.Va. 1976)
(radio station allowed to withhold identities of confidential sources who informed station of medical
hazards at a local chemical manufacturing plant because disclosure would deter those sources and
others from furnishing similar information in the future).
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3. Current Court Responses to Refusals to Disclose Confidential
Source Identities
Libel plaintiffs and journalists have competing interests at stake in
some requests for disclosure. A variety of sanctions have been used as
alternatives to jail sentences when journalists have refused to obey a
court order to identify sources. In half the states and at the federal level
there is no "shield law" to protect a reporter who declines to comply
with a disclosure order. But half the states do protect a reporter from
being adjudged in contempt of court for refusal to disclose confidential
sources.62 However, a shield law does not give complete immunity. Jour-
nalists who have refused to disclose sources in libel suits have been sub-
jected to other sanctions, including the entry of judgment for the other
party, a prejudicial jury instruction, or the withholding of evidence ob-
tained from the source.63 Thus, noncompliance with a request to reveal
confidential sources sometimes can lead to liability even though the
plaintiff has not met the burden of proving actual malice.
a. Default judgment: a court may order a default judgment based
solely on the defendant's refusal to disclose. In one instance, a $1.9 mil-
lion verdict was ordered after a newspaper refused to identify sources
used in preparing articles on a locally based insurance company which
was under investigation in several states." Although the award was
eventually reversed, the media defendant still had to bear the expense of
defending the suit and appealing under the threat of a huge award.
A court may threaten to enter judgment in plaintiff's favor if a de-
fendant does not agree to reveal confidential information. 65 This alterna-
tive is problematic because it may be excessive punishment for a
62. The Third Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's shield law in
Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 780 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1985). See, eg., CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1985) ("A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected
with or employed upon a newspaper... cannot be adjudged in contempt... for refusing to disclose
• .. the source of any information . . . or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information
obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the
public."). For a listing of similar state statutes, see Communications Law, 2 PRACTICING LAW
INST., 700, 700-40 (1982); see also Comment, The Newsman's Qualified Privilege: An Analytical Ap-
proach, 16 CAL. W. L. REv. 331, 368 n.284 (1980).
63. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 2034 (West Supp. 1985).
64. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 4 MEDIAL. REP. 1689, 1692 (Idaho
Dist. Ct. 1978), rev'd, 101 Idaho 795, 623 P.2d 103 (1980).
65. See, e.g., Rancho La Costa, Indus., v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 6 MEDIA L. REP. 1540, 1541
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1980).
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journalist's good faith attempt to exercise a first amendment right. 6 The
default judgment remedy may also violate due process because other de-
fenses which the media defendant might have are foreclosed because of
the refusal to reveal sources.67
b. Prejudicial jury instructions: a court may also issue a prejudicial
jury instruction in response to a defendant's refusal to reveal a confiden-
tial source.6 8 Several courts have told juries that a presumption arises
that no source exists when news media defendants refuse to reveal a
source. 9 The jury can then infer that a defendant published with actual
malice because a report is baseless.7" Although this solution is preferable
to the default judgment remedy because it allows a media defendant to
assert other privileges and defenses, it too is problematic. The presump-
tion that no source exists simply may be untrue, undermining any inter-
est in accuracy that the parties and the public might have in ordering
disclosure. This remedy also gives the judge full discretion, rather than
letting the jury decide the veracity or reliability of a claim of confidential-
ity.71 Another option is to put the reporter on the stand to testify about
the source and let the jury decide the veracity of the journalist and the
source.
c. Exclusion of tainted evidence: a court can preclude introduction
of the evidence gathered from the source when a journalist refuses to
reveal a source's identity. Although a reporter can testify that informa-
tion was gathered from the source and describe the surrounding circum-
stances, the reporter cannot introduce evidence obtained from the source
for benefit of the defense. The jury then assesses the credibility of the
reporter and the surrounding circumstances.72 One commentator views
this method as most desirable because it allows a journalist to testify
about a source without using evidence a plaintiff cannot evaluate. It also
leaves the credibility decision for the actual malice determination with
the jury.73 However, the line between testimony about the source and
66. See Kirtley, Discovery in Libel Cases Involving Confidential Sources and Non-Confidential
Information, 90 DICK. L. REv. 641, 663 (1986).
67. Id at 663 & n.205.
68. Rancho La Costa, 6 MEDIA L. REP. at 1541.
69. DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 880, 884 (D. Hawaii 1981); Downing v.
Monitor Publishing Co. Inc., 120 N.H. 383, 386-87, 415 A.2d at 683, 686 (N.H. 1980).
70. Downing 120 N.H. at 386, 415 A.2d at 685.
71. See Kirtley, supra note 66, at 664; see also infra text accompanying notes 176-78.
72. Kirtley, supra note 66, at 664-65 (citing Greenberg v. CBS, 69 A.D.2d 693, 708-09, 419
N.Y.S.2d 988, 997 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1979)).
73. See id.
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surrounding circumstances, and the identity of the source is sometimes
unclear. Because of a desire to protect a source, a journalist may not be
able to give complete details to a jury. For example, a libel plaintiff who
is seeking the identity of a source for retaliatory purposes may be able to
learn the identity from the journalist's testimony about the circum-
stances. A source can sometimes easily be traced if few have access to
sensitive information.74
Since sanctions which can drastically alter the outcome of a libel
case rest on the issue of confidential source protection, it is important to
establish a well defined test which reflects an appropriate balance of the
competing interests. Most federal courts state that a qualified privilege to
withhold the identity of confidential sources exists, but the scope of pro-
tection afforded is extremely unclear. The next section summarizes the
development of the current federal privilege.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUALIFIED FEDERAL PRMLEGE
The Supreme Court squarely faced the issue of a press privilege
against disclosure of confidential sources of information in Branzburg v.
Hayes." A reporter who had witnessed activities which were the subject
of a grand jury investigation into criminal activities was subpoenaed to
testify. The Court denied an unconditional privilege for newspersons to
refuse to testify, stressing that all citizens have a duty to appear before
grand juries to uphold the strong public interest in law enforcement. The
Court also noted that there was no common law privilege to refuse to
answer grand jury questions.76
The majority agreed in Branzburg, however, that a journalist's culti-
vation of confidential sources is somewhat protected by the first amend-
ment as a form of newsgathering. 77 The Court left room for a qualified
privilege and suggested that the amount of protection to be accorded
sources would vary with the situation. In this case, the grand jury sub-
poenas were ruled legitimate, and society's fundamental interest in law
74. See Blasi, supra note 28, at 277-78.
75. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Supreme Court has declined several cases concerning confiden-
tial sources since Branzburg. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938
(1974); Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930
(1977); Brown v. Traub, 5 MEDIA L. REP. 2041 (N.M.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); Ammer-
man v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M. 250, 572 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
906 (1977).
76. See Branzburg 408 U.S. at 684.
77. Id. at 681. This has been interpreted further as a right to gather information. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
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enforcement overrode the first amendment interests involved.7  The
Court reasoned that a grand jury's ability to summon witnesses is essen-
tial,79 and information about crime does not deserve protection in a con-
text where societal interests in the unobstructed functions of law
enforcement and the assignment of criminal justice prevail.80
The Court also provided guidelines to distinguish source disclosure
in the grand jury context from source disclosure in other contexts. The
Court in Branzburg made three assumptions about the chilling of
sources and the disruption of news flow which disclosure would have in
the grand jury context. First, the Court assumed that the sources had
valuable information about criminal activities which would aid the grand
jury in its law enforcement function. Thus, supplying the information
would be a valuable service to the public. Second, the Court asserted that
the sources would be disclosing this important information to friendly
parties only, such as law enforcement officers, who could certainly pro-
tect the sources from any feared retaliation. The sources were asked to
trust public officials who were concerned with the informant's welfare."
Third, the Court analyzed the deterrence of sources and concluded that
the Branzburg defendants did not sufficiently prove that disclosure to a
grand jury would deter other sources from giving such information "al-
ways or very often.",82
The Court's first concern was the public interest in law enforcement,
which, in this context, coincides with a public interest in disclosure of
the information. The Court narrowly described the type of source which
the journalist was protecting in the grand jury context. The Court envi-
sioned the sources as desiring anonymity either to unjustiflably escape
prosecution for their own connection with criminal activities8 3 or to
avoid being witnesses at a criminal trial or grand jury investigation . 4
Neither reason qualifies a source as having a justifiable fear of retaliation
78. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690.
79. The Court expressed concern that if a conditional privilege not to testify were established, a
large number of people could claim exemption from the obligation to give testimony and the grand
jury system would be threatened while claims were adjudicated. Id. at 705. Thus, a governmental
function mandated by the Constitution would be disrupted, affecting the government's law enforce-
ment duties. Id at 687-88.
80. Id. at 696.
81. "We doubt if the informer who prefers anonymity but is sincerely interested in furnishing
evidence of crime will always or very often be deterred by the prospect of dealing with those public
authorities characteristically charged with the duty to protect the public interest as well as his." Id.
at 695.
82. Id
83. Id at 691.
84. Id. at 693.
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because of disclosure to the grand jury. The Court reasoned that if the
informants' identities were known, they would be required to respond to
a subpoena.85 The Court feared that the criminal justice system might be
greatly hindered by numerous claims of confidentiality, and that the via-
bility of the grand jury system would be threatened.8 6
The Court in Branzburg, however, acknowledged that some sources
are particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure.8 7 Here the Court con-
sidered that an informant might justifiably fear that disclosure would
threaten "job security, personal safety or peace of mind."88 An informant
with news about official misconduct, criminal activities, or human rights
abuses, for example, may especially require confidentiality. The Court
envisioned that such sources would be protected when their identities
were revealed to a grand jury. The Court found that the traditional re-
sponsibility of the law enforcement officers to protect informants miti-
gated the chilling effect of disclosure orders in the grand jury context.8 9
In a libel suit, however, a source may have a more justified fear of
retribution from disclosure of his or her identity than in disclosure to a
grand jury.9" Many requests for disclosure in libel suits are for retaliatory
purposes91 and requests also can be used for harassment purposes in
other contexts. Some libel plaintiffs bring a suit to discover the identity of
a source rather than to seek compensation for reputational damage.92
For example, when a powerful official from another country demands
disclosure in a libel suit, the defendant's sources are not necessarily af-
forded the due process protection American citizens enjoy, nor the law
enforcement protection for sources which the Court described in
Branzburg. Foreign confidential sources may be subject to harassment,
physical harm, or criminal prosecution as a result of information dis-
closed through a libel suit discovery order. A detailed analysis of the
special factors to consider in the international news context will follow in
Part II. For now it is enough to note the narrow type of source the
85. Id at 695.
86. Id. at 705.
87. Id at 693.
88. Id. at 695.
89. Id. at 695.
90. Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir.), modified, 628 F.2d 932 (5th
Cir. 1980).
91. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 240 (noting the "grudge match overtone" of current libel
suits); Note, Source Protection in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 1981 COL. L. Rnv. 338, 354
n.108 (citing, Name that Source-or Else, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 16, 19, (1980) ("It is not
uncommon for the subjects of controversial articles or broadcasts to file libel suits for the sole pur-
pose of uncovering the source.")).
92. Kirtley, supra note 66, at 644.
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journalist was protecting at the expense of the public interest in law en-
forcement in Branzburg, and the protection the Court envisioned for
such a source when it ordered disclosure.
In addition to considering the danger to the particular sources, the
Court in Branzburg also undertook an analysis of the deterrence the dis-
closure order would have on future sources. The Court had difficulty in
measuring the chilling effect that disclosure of a reporter's sources to a
grand jury would have on other news sources. The Court found nothing
to indicate that a large percentage of all confidential news sources would
be affected by requiring those who had provided information about crim-
inal activity to a journalist to testify before a grand jury.93 Yet, in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,94 the Court did not require any empirical
proof that the state libel law resulted in actual deterrence of the press or
sources. The Sullivan Court found the fear of costly litigation and poten-
tial damage awards sufficient to produce a chilling effect on first amend-
ment rights if liability was imposed for false statements or statements
that a defendant could not prove true.95 Courts also have been willing to
assume a chilling effect on first amendment rights in other areas.96 But
the Court in Branzburg seemed to require some evidence of a chilling
effect in order to protect the identities of confidential sources in the grand
jury context.
Although the Court recognized that some sources would be inhib-
ited about giving information to journalists because of the threat of com-
pelled disclosure, it found only an "incidental burdening" in the grand
jury context.97 The grand jury disclosure requirement would not
"threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationships between reporters
and their sources." 98 Arguably, identification of certain types of sources
in libel suits constitutes more of a threat to the flow of information than
the Court imagined here. For example, it is certainly probable that a
large percentage of foreign sources who request confidentiality are un-
likely to speak to journalists if their identities will later be revealed to an
official in their own country through a libel suit.
It is evident that analyses of the issues in other contexts will differ
from the assessment of the concerns which the Court voiced in
93. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691.
94. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
95. Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REV. 829,
853-56 (1974).
96. It at 853-84.
97. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
98. Id. at 691.
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Branzburg. This Note focuses on the international news context as an
example, but thorough analyses need to be undertaken by courts in other
contexts where source disclosure requests arise. Before undertaking a de-
tailed contextual analysis, however, it will be helpful to see how subse-
quent courts have implemented the method of analysis laid out in
Branzburg when considering the issue of confidential source disclosure in
civil libel suits.
C. THE APPLICATION OF THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
1. The Branzburg Balancing Test as Applied To Newsgathering and
Newsprocessing
The Court in Branzburg narrowed the issue by emphasizing the
strong law enforcement interest at stake in the grand jury context. 99 Jus-
tice Powell, who concurred with the 5-4 majority, stressed that: "[tihe
Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of
news or in safeguarding their sources."" As later courts have noted, this
leaves room for a qualified privilege in civil cases where a strong public
interest in the protection of confidential sources or information overrides
any duty to disclose.
If... instances will arise in which First Amendment values outweigh
the duty of a journalist to testify even in the context of a criminal
investigation, surely in civil cases, courts must recognize that the pub-
lic interest in non-disclosure of journalists' confidential news sources
will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled
disclosure. 101
Thus, most courts have reasoned that Powell's position is the "minimum
common denominator" ' of the Branzburg majority, and have estab-
lished that a qualified federal privilege against disclosure exists, using a
balancing test to evaluate the claim of a privilege in each fact situation. 103
99. Id. at 682. ("The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury
subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commis-
sion of crime.").
100. IdM at 709 (Powell, J. concurring); see also id. at 681 ("without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.").
101. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 996 (1972) (discuss-
ing the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 179-80).
102. Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F.Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976).
103. See, eg., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st Cir. 1980); Baker, 470 F.2d at 784-85; Loadholtz v.
Fields, 389 F.Supp. 1299, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Mitchell v. Super. Ct. 37 Cal.3d 268, 277, 690 P.2d
625, 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 157 (1984).
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To determine if disclosure is mandated, a court weighs the interest in
disclosure against the first amendment interests at stake. Courts now rely
on a three-pronged test to evaluate disclosure requests: "(1) is the infor-
mation [sought] relevant, (2) can the information be obtained by alterna-
tive means, and (3) is there a compelling interest in the information?"''
The uncertainty surrounding the qualified privilege was com-
pounded when the Supreme Court considered another case involving dis-
closure of journalists' sources, Herbert v. Lando.l° A retired army officer
sued CBS, Inc., Atlantic Monthly magazine, producer Barry Lando, and
correspondent Mike Wallace for libel over a "60 Minutes" television pro-
gram and magazine article which the officer claimed labeled him a liar."16
As a public figure, he had to prove actual malice to recover for the al-
leged defamation. To prove this, Herbert maintained that he needed to
know the reporter's thoughts and conversations in preparing the pro-
gram and article to prove the actual malice element.
The Court held that the defendants must disclose this information
about the editorial process, but did not extend the holding to require
disclosure of confidential sources.10 7
To maintain the Sullivan standard, the Court in Herbert found that
such information, particularly journalists' conclusions about the veracity
of their source material, can be of substantial importance to the libel
plaintiff and is logically interwoven with the actual malice standard.10 8
The Court was reluctant to create a new evidentiary privilege which
would allow a journalist to erect an "impenetrable barrier" to a plain-
tiff's ability to prove actual malice with direct state-of-mind evidence.° 9
104. Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir.), modified, 629 F.2d 932 (5th
Cir. 1980) (referring to Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958)).
105. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
106. Id at 156.
107. The issue was: "What effect should be given to the First Amendment protection of the
press with respect to its exercise of editorial judgment in pre-trial discovery in a libel case governed
by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan?" Id. at 158 n.3. The second circuit opinion which the Supreme
Court overruled had held that the journalist's thoughts and conversations were protected pre-publi-
cation activities, and an inquiry into those would violate the first amendment and have a chilling
effect on the media. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153
(1979).
108. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169-70.
109. Id at 170. This has been interpreted by other courts to mean that denial of the information
requested by the plaintiff in Herbert would impose an additional editorial privilege which would
upset the Sullivan balance and make it nearly impossible for a plaintiff to prove actual malice. See,
e.g., Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 278-79, 690 P.2d 625, 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 158
(1984).
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The Court in Herbert allowed inquiries into a journalist's mental
state so that a libel plaintiff could meet the actual malice standard of
proof. The Court reasoned that these inquiries would not prohibit frank
exchanges or chill the journalist's first amendment rights because the in-
quiries simply deterred error and suppressed false information."' The
Court in Herbert deemed it a minor imposition to require responsible
journalists to take precautions in evaluating a story so that disclosure of
their own thoughts and conversations would not lead to liability. How-
ever, it is not within the journalist's control to mitigate the chilling effect
which the threat of disclosure has on sources. It is more reasonable to
impose liability under the Sullivan standard through Herbert inquiries
(newsprocessing) than to limit journalists' newsgathering abilities by im-
posing legal rules which might deter the amount of information sources
are willing to give journalists. If we believe the truth will emerge from
robust debate, it is not in the public interest to inhibit newsgathering. It
is in the newsprocessing, the interpretation and editing of facts, that jour-
nalists need to be careful to assure accuracy and lack of bias.
Further, libel plaintiffs have a much more legitimate interest in the
direct state-of-mind evidence which Herbert type inquiries can provide
than in the circumstantial evidence of actual malice which disclosure of
the identity of a source might offer."11 Confidential sources often only
provide the tips that begin an investigation; their identities will not be
central to proving that the defendant acted with actual malice. 1 2 Plain-
tiffs often have access to other types of state-of-mind proof and are not
prejudiced by withholding of sources.1 3 The journalist's thoughts and
conversations are more likely to be material in proving actual malice,"
4
and have been accepted by courts as direct state-of-mind evidence."'
Although most courts recognize that some privilege now exists for
confidential sources, some do not recognize any privilege for journalists
to withhold confidential sources or information in libel suits after
110. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 172-74.
111. Note, supra note 91, at 359-62.
112. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 599 (1st Cir. 1980).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 15-22; see also Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621
F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that disclosure of a confidential source may be compelled only
if there is no other means to prove malice); Note, supra note 91, at 359-60.
114. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 170; cf. Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, 6 MEDIA L. REP.
1540 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980).
115. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160 n.6, 165 n.15.
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Branzburg and Herbert.116 Some courts have interpreted Herbert as ne-
gating any constitutional privilege that might have existed after
Branzburg.17 These courts, however, have misinterpreted Herbert, have
failed to distinguish between newsprocessing and newsgathering, and
have failed to properly evaluate the contribution of source identity to the
actual malice determination." 8 It is important to distinguish Herbert
before determining the appropriate scope of the qualified privilege.
The confusion over Herbert has led some courts to conclude that
discovery of sources in libel suits should be regarded as normal civil dis-
covery requests, 1 9 thus giving improper weight to the first amendment
interests by disregarding potential chilling effects which disclosure orders
might engender. This problem is compounded by the trend of expanding
discovery, 20 particularly noticeable during the last two decades because
of the changes in libel law.' 2 ' Some courts have reacted to the changes in
libel law with a bias against the institutional power of the media and
attacks on the scope of first amendment freedoms for journalists. 122
More highly publicized libel suits in recent years have exhibited the
anti-media biases of litigants, jurors, and courts. 23 One commentator
notes that a new type of libel suit has developed since Herbert, which is
designed to harass and intimidate the media rather than seek compensa-
tion for reputational damage.124 Another commentator suggests that
suits like the Sharon case are not evidence of a defect in libel law (that it
is too favorable to journalists) "but that a trial's publicity and prospect of
enormous damages make it too tempting for plaintiffs to try to take his-
tory to court.' 25 Such litigation is often an "ideological weapon" for
political groups more concerned with issues than individual claims.' 2 6
116. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 320, 303 N.E. 2d 847 (1973);
Dalitz v. Penthouse Int'l, 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 474-75, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258 (1985).
117. See Note, supra note 91, at 357 n.137.
118. See Kirtley, supra note 66, at 656.
119. Rancho La Costa Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, 6 MEDIA L. REP. 1249, 1250 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1980).
120. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964).
121. DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp 880, 882 (D. Hawaii 1981).
122. See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc. 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980).
123. See, e.g., R. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 23, 51, 62; see generally Smolla, Let the Author
Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1983) (explaining
recent changes in defamation law and the resulting effects on attitudes toward American mass
media).
124. Kirtley, supra note 66, at 643.
125. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 28, col. 4.
126. R. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 246 ("Conservative public interest groups have become ven-
dors in the emerging libel industry.").
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Plaintiffs often threaten suits without regard to the truth or falsity of a
particular story in order to discourage a publisher or broadcaster from
making a story public. Some smaller news organizations have been finan-
cially harmed by libel claims127 and even national television networks
may be influenced by threats of libel suits before publishing.1 28
Courts have denounced "fishing expeditions" which seek disclosure
of confidential sources in overbroad discovery requests. "[D]iscovery
which seeks disclosure of confidential sources, and information supplied
by such sources, is not ordinary discovery. Judicial concern is not limited
to cases of harassment, embarrassment or abusive tactics; even a limited
narrowly drawn request may impinge upon First Amendment considera-
tions." '29 However, courts have sometimes disregarded those interests in
applying the qualified privilege.
2. Conflicts in Standards of Proof in the Balancing Test for a
Qualified Privilege
Courts have employed a variety of standards as the balancing test in
the civil libel context. Under the first standard applied, there is no privi-
lege to keep the identity of a source confidential if a libel plaintiff shows
that a genuine question of fact exists as to the truth of a statement.1 30
Here, the plaintiff only has to make a minimal factual showing and needs
no proof that the information is necessary to prove actual malice before a
court orders disclosure. One court using this standard reasoned that the
press has enough protection under the Sullivan standard, and any addi-
tional protection in the form of a stronger privilege would be too burden-
some for libel plaintiffs.13 1
127. Kirtley, supra note 66, at 644 n.26; see also Green v. Alton Telegraph Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d
755, 438 N.E.2d 203 (1982) (a small town telegraph company appealed from a $9.2 million dollar
libel judgment which forced the company to file for bankruptcy.).
128. Kirtley, supra note 66, at 643 n.21. Kirtley discusses an incident in which then Nevada
Senator Paul Laxalt filed a $250 million suit against a newspaper because of a story linking him to
organized crime. His attorneys also wrote letters to ABC and CBS television networks, which were
planning broadcasts on the story. Neither broadcast ever aired, perhaps because of the letters. This
is not surprising with the cost to defend the Sharon suit, supra notes 5-8, estimated at between five to
seven million dollars. Kirtley supra note 66, at 643 n.23 (citing Baer, The Am. Law., Nov. 1985, at
69). Smolla suggests such libel suits impose heavy societal costs in time, money, judicial resources
and the attendant spectacle. R. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 98.
129. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 268, 600 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984); see also
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977) (compulsory disclosure in the
course of a "fishing expedition" held to be precluded by the first amendment).
130. See Kirtley, supra note 66, at 656-57 (citing Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper
Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Sierra Life Ins. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, 101 Idaho 795, 623
P.2d 103 (1980); Downing v. Monitor Publishing, 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (1980)).
131. Downing 120 N.H. at 385-87, 415 A.2d at 685-86.
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Another standard used by courts is one which emphasizes the sec-
ond prong of the balancing test:132 Does the information sought go to
the "heart" of the claim? If a libel plaintiff's case is prejudiced by the
journalist's refusal to disclose the identity of a source, disclosure can be
ordered.133 Although this standard protects confidential sources whose
identities are not central to a plaintiff's case, it is primarily concerned
with the merits of a plaintiff's claim. It is very similar to the standard
used in Garland v. Torre,1 34 when a journalist first argued that the first
amendment protects source identity, long before the Supreme Court
adopted the Sullivan standard and considered the issue of confidential
source disclosure in Branzburg. In Garland, actress Judy Garland sued
for libel over a column that claimed she was overweight and the court
ordered disclosure of the columnist's sources. The same circuit later clar-
ified the heart of the matter standard, providing more protection for jour-
nalists in the civil libel context in light of Sullivan and Branzburg.13 1
Thus, the simple heart of the matter standard overemphasizes the private
interest in disclosure by equating it with the public interest in protection
of sources. In addition, the standard fails to acknowledge that the public
interest may override the private interest in disclosure in some
situations. 136
Most courts use a three-part balancing test, weighing the relevance
of the request, less restrictive alternatives, and the plaintiff's need for the
information to prove falsity and actual malice. 137 When assessing rele-
vance, courts often say that a libel plaintiff must demonstrate falsity with
substantial evidence, thus requiring more than the simple relevance re-
quired under the first standard discussed above.13 8 The second part of the
test involves an examination of reasonable alternatives before ordering
disclosure. 139 Courts use the third prong to determine if knowledge of
132. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
133. See Kirtley, supra note 66, at 657-58 (citing, inter alia, Mize v. McGraw Hill, 82 F.R.D.
475, 477 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 96 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 1982)).
134. Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d. 721, 726 (5th Cir.), modified, 628 F.2d 932 (5th
Cir. 1980) (citing Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958)).
135. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977) (discussing Baker
v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973)).
136. See Kirtley, supra note 66, at 658.
137. See, eg., In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983); Miller, 621 F.2d at 721; Semlich v.
Herald Co., No. 84-281C(5) (E.D. Mo. 1985); Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 583 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Dowd v. Calabrese, 577 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1983); Gad-
sen County Times, Inc. v. Home, 426 So.2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
138. See, eg., Miller, 621 F.2d at 726.
139. For more information about this part of the test, see infra text accompanying notes 212-13.
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the source's identity is necessary to meet the Sullivan standard. The iden-
tity of the source should be withheld unless the plaintiff's claim would be
precluded because of the withholding."4 However, this test is still prob-
lematic because it fails to consider situations in which the public interest
in nondisclosure outweighs the private interest in disclosure."g Once
plaintiff has met a threshold showing in a libel case, there is no assess-
ment of the public interest and the private interest at stake in a particular
context, such as the Supreme Court undertook in Branzburg. Thus,
courts are failing to properly evaluate the first amendment interests im-
plicated in the source disclosure controversy.
In the leading case defining the qualified privilege, Carey v.
Hume,"' a federal district court balanced the need for the testimony in
question and the claim of the reporter that the public's right to know
would be impaired by disclosure. 43 A journalist was ordered to reveal
the identities of witnesses to an alleged theft by the General Counsel of
the United Mine Workers' Union's (UMW) when these witnesses were
the only source the reporter had for the story. Employing the three-pro-
nged test, the court said disclosure was required because the information
sought was not frivolous. The court in Carey narrowly defined a frivo-
lous claim as the type in Cervantes v. Times, Inc. 14 Subsequent courts
can gain little guidance from the Carey court's use of the Cervantes exam-
ple because the suit was so blatantly frivolous-the mayor was very un-
likely to be able to establish the falsity of the Life article. At the other
extreme, other courts have suggested that a libel plaintiff should clearly
establish the falsity of the publication before a request for source disclo-
sure is considered.1 45
The Carey court discussed the second part of the balancing test, ex-
haustion of alternative means of discovering the information, and con-
cluded that it was unreasonable to ask the plaintiffs to interview all the
UMW employees to determine who had provided the information to the
140. Kirtley, supra note 66, at 660-61.
141. See id. at 661; see also infra text accompanying notes 214-18.
142. 492 F.2d 631 (D.D.C. 1974).
143. Id. at 636.
144. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). Here, the plaintiff mayor
took exception to four of 87 paragraphs in a Life magazine article which linked him to organized
crime. Id. at 991. The truth of the other 83 paragraphs was "either admitted or not expressly
denied." Carey, 492 F.2d at 637.
145. See infra Part III.
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journalist.' 4 Since the source-employees were eyewitnesses to the al-
leged theft and were the only source for the story, no other alternative
seemed feasible. The court hardly discussed the third element of the bal-
ancing test, the compelling interest in disclosure which merited the reve-
lation of the employee-witnesses' identities to the union's general
counsel. The court equated the public's interest in accuracy in a libel suit
with the public's strong interest in law enforcement identified in
Branzburg.147
The Carey court failed to be as specific as the Court in Branzburg
had been when analyzing the competing interests in the grand jury con-
text. The Carey court acknowledged that differences exist in the interests
involved but when it applied the traditional balancing test, it essentially
equated the interests in accuracy in the libel context with the law en-
forcement interests in the grand jury context. 48 Carey exemplifies the
way courts disregard the full first amendment analysis when the public
interest in nondisclosure counterbalances the private interest in disclo-
sure in a libel suit. 149
In the grand jury proceedings, the journalist and the government
were on the same side, rather than on opposing sides, as are parties in
libel suits. 50 Further, the Court in Branzburg noted that the question of
146. Carey, 492 F.2d at 638-39 (unreasonable to require one plaintiff to interview all the UMW
employees to discover the source); see also Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th
Cir. 1980). A high-ranking officer of the Teamsters union sued over a story which said he swindled
money from a pension fund. The court held that a plaintiff in a libel suit can compel disclosure of
the identity of a journalist's confidential source if knowing the informant's identity is the only way
plaintiff can establish malice and show that the defendant's news story was false or that the journalist
was reckless in relying on that source. See also Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing
Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTNGS L. J. 709, 739 (1975). Unfortunately, courts have
applied the Garland test haphazardly, giving unsatisfactory guidelines as to what level of investiga-
tion is necessary before a libel plaintiff exhausts the alternative means of obtaining the requested
information. In Carey, only one phone call was made to check the source's information before the
story went to print. Carey, 492 F.2d at 638. The journalists in Cervantes had conducted months of
research, with numerous people spending countless hours on the article. Id. at 637-38. It remains
unclear what a court should do with a case somewhere between these two extremes. In Dalitz v.
Penthouse Int'l, 168 Cal. App. 3d 478, 481, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1985), although the journalists
furnished the court with a "voluminous mass of books, articles and newspaper clippings," the court
still dismissed the journalists' ability to refute the claim for disclosure.
147. The Carey court limited its holding because of the limited record in the case. It could not
say that no purpose was served by the disclosure order, i.e., that the plaintiff was so unlikely to meet
the actual malice standard that disclosure served no purpose. Carey, 492 F.2d at 638.
148. Id. at 635-36.
149. A later court did attempt to distinguish the interests in the grand jury context from those
involved in a civil libel suit. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir.), modi-
fied, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980).
150. Miller, 621 F.2d at 725.
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a reporter's privilege in the grand jury context places two distinct public
interest at odds-the interest in law enforcement and the interest in an
unfettered flow of information. 1 ' A later court concluded that the poli-
cies supporting a privilege in libel cases is stronger than in Branzburg or
Herbert.152 In a libel case, there is merely the private interest in disclo-
sure. There is no public interest at stake comparable to the importance
of law enforcement in Branzburg. The government and the press in
Branzburg were both attempting to ferret out wrongdoing, while a plain-
tiff and a media defendant have opposite interests during a libel case.
The Miller court noted that "a defamed plaintiff might relish an opportu-
nity to retaliate against the informant" through a source disclosure
request. 15
3
The Carey court found that the public interest in accuracy in civil
litigation justified the disclosure. There was little assessment in Carey to
compare the weight of the public interest in accuracy in libel suits with
the public interest in law enforcement discussed at length in
Branzburg154 There was no consideration of any danger to the source-
employees or the deterrence of such reports in the future which might
result from a disclosure order. Although the Carey court acknowledged
that compelling disclosure could restrict the scope of legitimate
newsgathering activity,1 55 the court's inquiry focused on the plaintiff's
heavy burden of proof after Sullivan. The court said that the plaintiff
needed to know the identity of the confidential sources to prove they
were not reliable or that the defendant misrepresented the sources or re-
lied recklessly on the sources."6
Although the result reached in Carey is not clearly unreasonable
because of the circumstances-the reporter was able to present little evi-
dence of careful research to refute the charge of actual malice' 5 --the
case is troubling because of the anti-media bias evident in the concurring
opinion. Questions of what evidence is necessary to establish actual mal-
ice are extremely difficult. Courts often mention the tension which the
Sullivan standard imposes, providing protection to the media, but erect-
ing a heavy burden of proof for the plaintiff. Courts have referred to
151. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).
152. Miller, 621 F.2d at 725.
153. Id.
154. The Carey court did note the strong prosecutorial interest in disclosure in the Branzburg
context, but failed to justify the importance of accuracy in civil trials which similarly mandated the
disclosure in the civil libel context. See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 632, 636 n.6 (D.D.C. 1974).
155. Id. at 639.
156. Id. at 637.
157. See supra note 143.
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actual malice as a heavy, sometimes unfair, burden of proof for the plain-
tiff which makes discovery of sources critical.158 This obscures the confi-
dential source issue and leads to unnecessarily subjective balancing.
3. The Effect of Anti-Media Bias in the Application of the Branzburg
Balancing Test
One of the dangers with vague criteria such as those used in the
balancing test is the influence of subjective preferences. Dislike of the
protection given defendants under the Sullivan standard is often evident
in the application of the balancing test. The judge who wrote the concur-
ring opinion in Carey admonished the media for taking advantage of
what the judge considered broad new found freedoms afforded by Sulli-
van.'59 Combined with advances in technology and concentrated owner-
ship of media outlets, the judge felt this gave great power to the press. 160
Ronald Dworkin, on the other hand, notes that the power of the press
has increased, but has done so along with the growth of power of the
government and other powerful institutions it is supposed to check. '6
The institutional press has been termed an "institutional counterweight
to the presidency."162 Some media critics fail to realize that the growing
power of the press is also checked by increasing public skepticism of the
press. 163
The concurring judge in Carey viewed a privilege against disclosure
as a shield of anonymity for the press. 164 He was concerned about the
public's lack of protection against a powerful press, failing to realize that
when journalists raise the first amendment defense, they are equating
158. See Carey, 492 F.2d at 634; see also DeRoburt v. Gannett, 507 F. Supp. 880, 884 (D.
Hawaii 1981) ("The media defendant cannot have it both ways: he cannot enjoy the protection
afforded by the heavy burden imposed upon the public official plaintiff by Sullivan and at the same
time enjoy a privilege that prevents the plaintiff from obtaining the evidence necessary to carry that
burden.").
159. Carey, 492 F.2d at 639-40 (MacKinnon, J., concurring); see also id. at 635 (discussion of
whether Sullivan, in light of Garland, "so downgraded their [ibel suit's] social importance that a
plaintiff's interest in pressing such a claim can rarely, if ever, outweigh a newsman's interest in
protecting his sources").
160. Id. These same sentiments are echoed in R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 376.
161. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 34, col. 4.
162. Interview with William Schneider, American Enterprise Institute, on the MacNeil/Lehrer
News Hour (Feb. 11, 1987).
163. R. SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 9 (seventy percent of the public believes the institutional press
is biased and only twenty percent had a great deal of confidence in the media).
164. Others voice similar concerns. See, R. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 27, col. 2 (discussing
Adler's critical assessment of two recent libel trials in RECKLEss DISREGARD, supra note 7 ("Adler
seems to question the actual malice standard, "which she believes grants the press almost a sovereign
immunity from the consequences of its mistakes."); see also Dworkin, supra note 6, at 34, col. 3.
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their interest with the public interest in a vigorous press and the unfet-
tered flow of information in a free society. 165 Public interests are impli-
cated when source disclosure requests by an individual in a libel action
threaten to harm particular sources or deter sources from giving journal-
ists information in the future.
166
Some people oppose any privilege against disclosure of confidential
sources by claiming that if journalists are allowed to rely less on confi-
dential sources, they will only be more cautious, and it is healthy to en-
courage caution among journalists. They cite stories which journalists
have attributed to non-existent confidential sources. 167 But it is uncer-
tain that caution about using sources is a good thing to encourage. Confi-
dential sources can be a means of correcting false or incomplete stories
before they go to print, because sources are often used to confirm or
guide journalists.1 68 The aggressive competitiveness of the post-Water-
gate press is another rationale for curtailing confidential source use. But
it is debatable whether the press had been aggressive enough as investiga-
tors. For example, the press failed to discover any of the facts surround-
ing the arms deals between the Reagan Administration and Iran until a
foreign newsweekly published the story. This has been attributed, in
part, to the lack of sources in Congress and the Administration's unwill-
ingness to provide information. It is difficult to quantify the amount of
caution and aggressiveness we want to encourage in journalists, but, as
argued above, irresponsible journalism can be checked more effectively
through evidentiary findings at the newsprocessing stage, rather than the
newsgathering stage.
169
Journalists have other incentives to be extremely hesitant before
printing a story using confidential sources, and often censor material of
their own accord. The formal rules and informal checks now present in
newsrooms reflect this caution. The public does not trust stories attrib-
uted to anonymous sources and editors are thus cautious about their
use.1 71 Media outlets often require that a reporter reveal any confidential
source to editors, and stories are often checked with an attorney if they
165. See, eg., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636, 639-40 (D.D.C. 1974).
166. See supra text accompanying note 101.
167. The fabrication of a confidential source by a Washington Post reporter surfaced only after
the story based on the source won a Pulitzer prize. Journalists became concerned over ethical
problems in response. See Friendly, Paper's False Article is a Major Topic at a Convention of Newspa-
per Editors, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1981, at A16, col. 2.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
170. See Blasi, supra note 28, at 244; see also supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
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contain sensitive material. Editors are more likely to entrust the credibil-
ity of their paper to experienced reporters with well developed sources.
Often journalists and sources engage in long-term relationships and a
publication is thus able to assess the reliability of a source over time. 171
Journalists are also increasingly concerned with ethics and have devel-
oped codes dealing with the use of confidential sources. 172 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the threatening cost of defending li-
bel suits also has a restraining effect on the press. 173 Even if statements
are true, media defendants may not want to defend them in "expensive
and protracted litigation brought by public figures financed by political
groups seeking political goals."174 With such restraints already in place,
and in light of the press' role as a check on powerful government
branches, courts need to be careful not to implement new rules for jour-
nalists in libel suits because of any bias against the institutional media
and its power. Courts need to be particularly careful because confusion
and bias often cause juries to disregard the complex standards in libel
cases. 175
One case particularly exemplifies the disregard for first amendment
interests which can be engendered by the current balancing approach and
the lack of contextual specificity with which it is used. The president of
Nauru, an island republic in the Pacific, filed a libel suit over an article
written in a Guam daily newspaper. 176 The story concerned an alleged
loan from the plaintiff to a group from the Marshall Islands who sought
separation from Micronesia. The plaintiff maintained that the article de-
famed him by linking him to a serious crime under Nauru law and by
implying that he interfered with the internal political affairs of a foreign
nation in violation of diplomatic standards.1 77 The court summarily
granted his request for disclosure, ruling that no source exists when a
journalist refuses to talk, thus leading to the inference that actual malice
171. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
172. See also, D. ANDERSON & B. ITULE, CONTEMPORARY NEws REPORTING 348-57 (1984);
Sigma Delta Chi Code of Ethics (Society of Professional Journalists) (1973).
173. See, eg., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
174. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 34, col. 4.
175. See, eg., P_ SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 188 ("Mhe First Amendment's protective rules for
the press often get lost once the jury is ensconced behind closed doors."). Smolla discusses the case
in which the president of Mobil Oil, William Tavoulareas, sued because a story said that he set his
son up in business. Citing an American Lawyer investigative piece, Smolla concluded that the jury in
the case totally ignored the actual malice standard in its $2.05 million verdict against the Washington
Post. Although the judge overturned the verdict, an appellate court reinstated it and the case is
currently being reviewed en bane by the District of Columbia Circuit. Id., at 194-95.
176. DeRoburt v. Gannett, 507 F. Supp. 880 (D. Hawaii 1981).
177. Id. at 882.
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could be proven because the story was baseless. As shown earlier, the
court seems to have used a standard that completely omits consideration
of first amendment interests.
178
The court did not discuss the public interest in information and in-
stead focused on the plaintiff's interest in defending his reputation. This
is troubling since the Supreme Court has previously stated that reputa-
tion must sometimes yield to the public welfare if the public benefit of the
information is great.179 Moreover, the importance of this type of knowl-
edge also may counterbalance the private inconvenience or injury to the
plaintiff.
Some subjectivity is inherent in the method set out by the Court in
Branzburg, because it leaves room for a balancing of competing interests,
which is desirable perhaps to both libel plaintiffs and journalists.8 0
However, the potential for subjective interpretation with a balancing test,
has permitted courts to use the discretionary elements of the test to disre-
gard first amendment interests. Some courts virtually ignored the first
amendment 181 or applied the Branzburg test haphazardly, finding "rele-
vance" without requiring an adequate demonstration of the necessity of
the information.18 1
Further, courts have failed to follow the Branzburg lead by failing to
look to the factors of a particular case and articulate the balance of inter-
ests with contextual specificity. This reluctance to fully calculate contex-
tual balances has resulted in a disregard for the Sullivan standard,
leaving important interests unprotected. It is imperative that courts at-
tempt to better articulate contextual analyses to provide more predict-
ability, thus ensuring less self-censorship and encouraging the flow of
news to the public. If the special problems in one context of civil libel
suits-the context of international reporting-are specifically assessed,
courts can use such an analysis to evaluate disclosure claims in that con-
text and draw similarities or distinctions between that context and
others.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
179. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964).
180. See, eg., Blasi, supra note 28, at 284.
181. See Note, supra note 91, at 353, citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 435
(10th Cir. 1977) (commenting that the trial court conceded a first amendment privilege against dis-
closure, but then did not give "any consideration to the existence of a qualified privilege").
182. See, eg., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., No.78-268 (D.N.H. 1979), va-
cated and remanded, 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980).
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II. SPECIAL CONCERNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
NEWS CONTEXT
The inadequacy of the current balancing approach and the lack of
specific contextual applications by the courts are especially grievous in
the international news context. The importance of international news to
the American public and the greater likelihood of harm to sources, with
the resultant interruption in the flow of news, need to be analyzed. Law-
suits similar to those mentioned in the introduction, pitting the exercise
of first amendment rights against the reputational interests of foreign li-
bel plaintiffs, can only be expected to increase with the continual expan-
sion of international news coverage.
A. PUBLIC AWARENESS
The media plays an indispensable role in increasing public aware-
ness of international events. Such knowledge is critical today to enable
citizens to participate effectively in a democratic society. The public
needs to acquire information about links between foreign events or for-
eign politicians and our own government, corporations, or organizations
if we are to make informed political choices and intelligently exercise our
rights of citizenship.
News about the United States' role in world affairs and the impact
of international events on American life needs to be fostered for the pub-
lic interest. We need to know about international affairs because events
in foreign countries are having an increasing effect on our daily lives.
The Middle East oil glut and the embargo in 1973-74 demonstrated the
increasing interdependence of the United States and other nations. The
rise in terrorist attacks against Americans abroad also demonstrates how
vulnerable the United States is to international pressures today. Within
the last decade, numerous Americans have been held hostage in Iran and
Lebanon; airlines have been hijacked; Americans have been killed by ter-
rorists who have grievances against the United States' foreign policies.
In assessing the conduct of our government, information about our in-
volvement in foreign countries is essential. For example, the recent arms
deals with Iran contradicted the official reports of the Reagan
Administration. 18 3
With some 170 countries in the world, there is a great range and
amount of information which could affect Americans. We have been un-
prepared for certain crises in the past and have not fully understood the
183. See Dworkin, supra note 6, at 34, col. 4.
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complex international tensions which have contributed to the develop-
ment of some of these crises. A press which provides extensive coverage
of economic, social, and political developments abroad is necessary to
alleviate some of this uncertainty and enable Americans to effectively
participate in our representative system of government, as the United
States functions in an interdependent world.
The American public particularly needs extensive reports on foreign
nations with which we have political and economic relationships. Con-
gress allocates billions of dollars of foreign aid each year, and it is impor-
tant for Americans to keep abreast of changes or problems in countries
which are dependent on or affected by our foreign aid decisions. The
press has a responsibility to maintain its watchdog function because it is
unrealistic to rely solely on the official news reports of a foreign govern-
ment which has an interest in gaining or retaining aid from the United
States. Nor is it the sole responsibility of the United States Department
of State to decide which countries are deserving of foreign aid. Those
decisions demand the participation of an informed public. Vigorous in-
ternational news coverage can keep the American public informed by
presenting a more neutral view of the overall situation in a country and
by monitoring developing problems so we can assess how our interests
are being affected.
The press has a responsibility to meet the informational needs of the
public by responding to the current global interdependence and the rising
American interest in international affairs.' 84 The press must serve as the
global eyes and ears of the American public overseas. The press has the
resources and technology to compile facts and investigate international
events in a way which private citizens cannot.
An abundance of sources is especially valuable in the international
news context because Americans often need to learn about a multitude of
factors to fully understand a foreign news story. Journalists need to pro-
vide more background information in these stories than in most domestic
stories to explain the complexity of a situation and its implications. A
story with important implications for Americans may occur in London,
and readers can readily understand the report because of the similarities
in the social and political structures of England and our own country.
184. M. ROSENBLUM, Coups AND EARTHQUAKES 8 (1981). Recent polls suggest that the pub-
lic is concerned about world affairs coverage. Forty-one percent of those polled across the nation in
1978 expressed deep interest in international reporting. A Washington Post readership survey re-
cently rated news about international affairs above domestic news or White House news. Id.
1987] 1661
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1631
But an important story can just as easily occur today in countries like
Pakistan or Malaysia, which hold less familiarity for most Americans.
Interpretation and depth are needed to put the facts in the proper
socio-political context for a faraway American reader. To be accurately
informed, a reader must understand the patterns within the country, the
relationship between that country and its neighbors, its religious heri-
tage, its history, its economic situation, and recent developments which
have contributed to a given situation. Journalists have an obligation to
provide a variety of perspectives in this context so that the public does
not receive merely a modified police report or a public relations speech
from a foreign official. To demonstrate the full range of contrasting opin-
ions, journalists often must promise confidentiality to a source in opposi-
tion to a government who can offer a contrast to the more readily
available official reports. A responsible journalist finds the appropriate
balance to describe the facts by including a variety of alternative sources.
It even can be misleading for an international journalist who has
been an eyewitness to an event to rely solely on his or her own perspec-
tive. Surface appearances in a foreign country are not as trustworthy or
familiar as they might be in most domestic news contexts. 18 Journalists
often seek to rely on a combination of sources for a story-including
official sources, secret reports, diplomatic sources, scholars, church lead-
ers, workers, and foreign journalists."8 6 A church leader may have as
much to fear in some countries as someone from within a government's
security force who leaks information. So although these persons would be
reliable, nonconfidential sources in most domestic news reports, they are
often unwilling to identify themselves to the American press. An execu-
tive in a multinational company overseas is also more likely to request
secrecy before giving information to a journalist because of a legitimate
fear of retaliation than is an executive of an American corporation in a
domestic news story.18 7 These sources can provide tips or confirm cer-
tain facts for a journalist, but may be unwilling to be named because of
fears that they will later be subject to retaliation in their own country for
supplying such information.' 8
185. Id at 49-52.
186. Id at 35-42.
187. Id
188. Id. at 193-202.
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B. PROTECTION OF SOURCES FROM RETALIATION
AND CHILLING EFFECTS
In all types of reporting, persons who are willing to identify them-
selves lend credibility to an account. However, in a foreign country, espe-
cially one with an authoritarian regime, a story attributed to an official
source is likely to yield a propagandized version of the facts.' 89 Journal-
ists are more reliant on confidential sources in such a situation, but they
still must use caution. A foreign journalist, often unfamiliar with a coun-
try, has to employ selective belief with all sources. If startling informa-
tion comes from a new, unknown source, it is thoroughly checked
against reports from other trusted sources or confirmed "off the record"
to the journalist's satisfaction by, for example, someone inside a govern-
ment agency or embassy. 9 ' But foreign officials, diplomats, or State De-
partment personnel sources are often constrained by their official
capacities and cannot relay sensitive or potentially volatile information.
The reasons for requiring confidentiality can be more legitimate in
this context because the source may be a member of a political organiza-
tion opposed to a foreign government or particular officials in power. In
other countries, a source is not guaranteed the same due process protec-
tion which our society gives to those whose opinions conflict with gov-
ernment officials. If the identity of such a source were revealed in a libel
trial, the source could subsequently be charged with an offense for speak-
ing to the American public via the press. In some countries it is a crimi-
nal act to urge changes in the government's structure to noncitizens.' 91
Journalists also need to rely on confidential sources in the interna-
tional news context frequently because they lack access to accurate, unbi-
ased information. Access is often barred by governments who are hostile
to negative news in the foreign press. Some politicians feel that a robust
public debate in the foreign newspapers will intensify domestic unrest or
strengthen an opposition party. Many countries also fear that aggressive
coverage of their affairs may lead to negative reactions from American
citizens and politicians, resulting in crippling cuts in the foreign aid they
receive from the United States. Foreign governments sometimes exercise
189. Id. at 42-47.
190. Id. at 47-48.
191. For example, Nobel Peace Prize recipient Bishop Desmond Tutu could be charged with
treason for advocating through the media that the international community support certain political
organizations which seek to reform the current government in South Africa. Speech at University of
Southern California, Jan. 26, 1986. For a description of numerous South African restrictions on
speech, assembly and the press, see generally Tutu, The United States and South Africa: Human
Rights and American Policy, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 1 (1985).
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control of information by restricting the entry visas of journalists, or by
interrogating and harassing journalists who offend them.1 92 All access
for foreign journalists within China was severely restricted until 1979
and, despite recent liberalizations, a respected journalist was recently ac-
cused of spying and suddenly expelled. He maintained he was merely
talking to sources active in recent student protests urging democratic re-
forms. 19 3 It is still difficult to gain access to information and unofficial
reports in many African and Latin American countries. American jour-
nalists, bolstered by their domestic constitutional watchdog function and
a societal tradition of free and vigorous debate, can pose threats for com-
munist countries, "friendly" countries, and non-aligned countries.
If a government controls all the domestic media outlets in a country
and does not guarantee that its citizens can speak without recrimination,
a journalist must often turn to confidential informants to balance the
publicly available official account of an incident. Attempts are made to
verify information with documents, but this may not always be feasible in
foreign countries where the state owns the media outlets and materials
like our congressional records are not publicly available. Thus, reliance
on sources with a great need for secrecy, such as refugees and political
dissidents, is often necessary when access to information is restricted.
A chilling effect on the dissemination of news is already present be-
cause of the restrictions of civil liberties in many countries. This effect
can be increased by journalists' hesitancy to pursue stories which require
investigation through the use of confidential sources. A source may be
subject to harm because of disclosure through a libel suit discovery order.
Other sources may be deterred from giving information in the future and
the American public's interest in international news dissemination may
be pitted against the libel plaintiff's interests.
The importance of international news, the likelihood of harm to par-
ticular sources, and the potential chilling effect which arbitrary violations
of promises of confidentiality would yield, can be shown by examining a
common type of international news story. Over the last decade, Ameri-
can audiences have come to regard human rights reporting as increas-
ingly important. When the public hears of human rights abuses,
192. Freedom Under Attack Around the World, WORLD PRESS REPORT 44-48, (1987) (excerpt
from 74 nation survey of press restrictions worldwide citing expulsions, licensing, visa limitations,
censorship, murders, and jailings). See also M. ROSENBLUM, supra note 184, at 93-109 (discussing
the many direct and indirect methods used to influence and control information and dissemination);
S. KELLY, ACCESS DENIED--THE POLITICS OF PRESS CENSORSHIP (1978) (discussing the interna-
tional politics of press and information control).
193. L.A. Times, Jan. 27, 1987 at A5, col. 1.
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tremendous pressure can be put on our government. This pressure im-
mediately can affect United States' support for a country.194 In this area
of reporting it is often impossible to find sources who can document tor-
ture or abuse publicly. Yet the reports of a government dependent on aid
from the United States or the reports given by those opposed to a regime
accused of human rights violations cannot be fully believed. The partial
or delayed reports submitted to human rights agencies are not always
adequate. Surviving torture victims are difficult to find. Those who have
escaped to the United States may be reluctant to speak to the press for
fear that retaliation will be taken against their families still residing in the
country or that they will be deported if they are here illegally.
For example, one journalist tells of a story he wrote where the infor-
mation he was able to confirm on record was an extremely watered down
version of the truth. In Argentina, after the 1976 coup, reports surfaced
that the military routinely disposed of Argentineans who had "disap-
peared" by dumping the persons alive (or dead from torture) into the
ocean from military helicopters. One source the journalist trusted told
him the details and he was able to confirm this information with an air
force officer. Because none of his sources were willing to speak without a
guarantee of confidentiality, he could only write a general story--one
which did not contradict the false military accounts, and which did not
reveal that the bodies washed ashore were Argentineans murdered by
their own government.' 95
Foreign politicians are certainly entitled to a fair forum in which to
pursue claims for damage to their reputations. But limits need to be im-
posed so courts can screen out meritless or retaliatory requests for disclo-
sure of confidential sources. To minimize disruption in the flow of news
and discourage the dissipation of an excessive amount of resources in this
type of litigation, certain threshold requirements should be met by a
plaintiff before a court reviews a request for disclosure of a confidential
source. Then, courts need to analyze carefully the competing interests at
stake in a particular context before compelling disclosure.
194. M. ROSENBLUM, supra note 184, at 193-202.
195. Id.
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR EVALUATING REQUESTS
FOR DISCLOSURE
First, a threshold requirement is necessary to screen some of the
frivolous or retaliatory requests for discovery that are likely to be fos-
tered in certain contexts. Frivolous or retaliatory discovery requests may
be particularly common in libel suits.196 The threshold inquiry when re-
quests for disclosure of confidential sources arise in libel suits should be
to determine first that the action is not frivolous (in other words, "a pre-
tense for using discovery powers") and second, the "plaintiff should show
that it can establish jury issues on essential elements of its case not the
subject of the contested discovery." '197 The burden should be placed on
the plaintiff to establish falsity as a jury issue before disclosure is granted.
Although the information sought in Mitchell v. Superior Court'98
went to "the heart" of the plaintiff's claim, and thus might be necessary
for the plaintiff to prove actual malice, the California court did not order
disclosure. The plaintiffs had not made a prima facie showing that the
alleged defamatory statements were false. Similarly, in Sierra Life,'99 the
Idaho Supreme Court reversed a lower court's disclosure order because
the plaintiffs failed to show that inability to discover confidential sources
obstructed the plaintiffs' ability to prove the article's falsity. 2" The
Supreme Court recently affirmed that the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof in establishing the falsity of an allegedly defamatory publication.2 10
Several federal courts have suggested such a threshold requirement,20 2
and some state courts also recognize this requirement in ordinary civil
libel litigation.20 3
Courts should also require the plaintiff to show that the identity of a
confidential source is necessary to prove actual malice. Disclosure should
not be ordered unless the plaintiff can show that the verdict is likely to
196. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
197. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597-98 (1st Cir. 1980).
198. 37 Cal.3d 268, 283, 609 P.2d 625, 634-35, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161-62 (1984).
199. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 6 MEDIA L. REP. 1769 (Idaho
1980).
200. See id. at 1769.
201. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1563 (1986).
202. See Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d. 563, 597 (Ist Cir. 1980);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d. 986, 993 (8th Cir. 1972); Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 120
N.H. 383, 386-88, 415 A.2d 683, 686 (1980). But some courts interpret Herbert as denying such a
prima facie falsity requirement. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 174-75 n. 23.
203. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 62, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984); Sierra
Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 4 MEDIA L. REP. 1689 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1978), rev'd,
6 MEDIA L. REP. 1769 (Idaho 1980).
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turn on the presence or absence of the evidence which the identities of
confidential sources would supply. Disclosure should be compelled only
when it is essential for proving actual malice, not when it would provide
only cumulative evidence. 2" The Supreme Court recently clarified that a
plaintiff needs to present clear and convincing evidence to meet the ac-
tual malice standard at the summary judgment stage in a libel suit.205
The plaintiff in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby said that a story in The Investi-
gator defamed him by implying he was a neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist,
and fascist.20 6 The plaintiff said the author, Jack Anderson, had used
patently unreliable sources and failed to adequately verify the informa-
tion before publication. However, the author showed careful research
and numerous sources in an affidavit, and therefore the Court required
more evidence from the plaintiff to meet the actual malice standard-
enough so that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff °20 7 This par-
allels the certain relevance standard discussed by some courts.20 8
In addition to these threshold requirements for a plaintiff, a defend-
ant should make an initial showing of a publication's truth or a refuta-
tion of any possibility of actual malice. If the defendant established that
the published statements were true or not defamatory, or if the defendant
could refute the possibility of actual malice with a demonstration of care-
ful investigation, he or she could then prevail immediately on the issue of
source disclosure. The case law yields no conclusive guidelines for what
constitutes adequate investigation to refute any possibility of actual mal-
ice,209 but if the defendant can show that it is highly unlikely that the
identity of the source will furnish enough evidence to contradict the care-
ful research presented, a court could fairly hold that it would be unlikely
that the plaintiff can prove actual malice.
In a situation where it is difficult to determine how the evidence
would affect a plaintiff's ability to establish actual malice, a court could
consider ordering a journalist-defendant's notes to be sealed while the
204. See Note, supra note 91, at 363.
205. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
206. Id. at 2508.
207. Id. at 2512-13.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 132-36; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433,
438 (10th Cir. 1972). Judge Bork recently stated that trial courts should determine if a claim has
merit before allowing broad discovery. He noted that a pleading defeating a motion for summary
judgment is not a license to harass, suggesting that the trial court attempt to minimize the "burden a
possibly meritless claim is capable of imposing upon free and vigorous journalism." McBride v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 717 F.2d 1460, 1461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
209. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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plaintiff develops evidence on the defendant's state of mind under Her-
bert type inquiries.2 10 A court also could review a journalist's notes for
inferences of actual malice and to determine if disclosure is likely to lead
to evidence essential for meeting the Sullivan standard. Alternatively, a
court could conduct an in camera review of sensitive material without
revealing the source's identity to determine its relevance to the mental
culpability requirement.211 These remedies, however, like some of the al-
ternatives to jailing a reporter for failure to disclose the identity of a
source, remove central issues from the jury.
Perhaps a thorough examination by the court of alternative sources
of information is a better solution. The Mitchell plaintiffs' request was
determined to be overbroad because they failed to show they had suffi-
ciently exhausted all alternative sources of information. The fourth cir-
cuit recently affirmed the denial of an order for source disclosure, ruling
that alternative sources had not been fully exhausted.21 2 The court in
LaRouche v. NBC required the plaintiff to demonstrate exhaustion of all
reasonable alternative means of obtaining the information. Because the
plaintiff failed to meet this requirement, the defendant television network
did not have to disclose the sources and could rely on them at trial.2"'
After a thorough assessment of all reasonable alternatives, a court
can proceed to evaluate specific contextual factors. Once the plaintiff has
met the threshold requirements of falsity and essential evidence, and af-
ter the defendant has failed to prevail on the actual malice issue, a court
is ready to undertake such an evaluation. As demonstrated in Part II for
the international news context, a court should consider the potential
harm to a particular source, the likelihood of deterrence of other sources,
and the importance of the information to the public. A journalist could
provide evidence on the human rights record of a country, or show that a
person in the position of the confidential source might be particularly
vulnerable. The defendant could establish particular vulnerability by
showing that there is a physical threat or possibility of other harm to
sources disproportionate to plaintiff's litigation needs.2" 4 A journalist
also might show that confidential sources are particularly valuable for
certain types of stories and a disclosure order is likely to deter similar
210. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
211. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1980).
212. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 282, 690 P.2d 625, 633-34, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152,
160-61 (1984).
213. LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Corp., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S.Ct. 79 (1986).
214. But see supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
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sources from giving such information in the future.215 If problems are
prevalent in a particular context, such as the lack of access to informa-
tion and the denial of due process protection in the international news
context, courts should consider them in determining the public interest
in nondisclosure.
If a media defendant can establish that the request for discovery
interferes excessively with its ability to report in the foreign country, dis-
closure could be denied.2 16 A media defendant needs to prove some chil-
ling effect after Branzburg, but exact empirical information is often
difficult to present.217 A journalist might show the interference which
disclosure would cause. Some courts have noted that disclosure may dis-
rupt the ability of the media to do its job.218 If it is necessary to cultivate
certain sources in a particular context, perhaps more protection is
justified.
This is not true just for international news. The Court in Branzburg
made certain assumptions about the type of source desiring protection,
the danger to the source, and the kind of deterrence that disclosure to a
grand jury might cause. 219 The Mitchell court acknowledged that if the
information given by a source resembles information about political cor-
ruption, criminal activities, or unethical activities which are of critical
importance in maintaining an informed society-such as "whistle-
blowers" give about domestic activities22 0-courts should be careful that
the plaintiff bears the burden of substantial threshold requirements so
that frivolous suits, or suits brought merely for retaliatory purposes, are
deterred.
215. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597-98 (lst Cir. 1980).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 183-95.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48, 87-98.
218. Some courts emphasize that a disclosure privilege should be designed to reduce interfer-
ence or disruption which could harm the flow of important news to the public. See, e.g., Bruno, 633
F.2d. at 595-98.
Why should a party to a suit be allowed to tap into the hard-earned knowledge of a re-
porter whose whole career is based on his ability to gather information? Why should the
media be required to interrupt its newsgathering and disseminating activities to assume the
burden of providing what is in essence its work product to litigants, except upon the most
compelling reasons? The opportunity for exploitation is great.
Fawley v. Quirk, 11 MEDIA L. RpTR., 2340 (1985) (George, J., concurring); see also Carey v. Hume,
492 F.2d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
219. See supra notes 75-98 and accompanying text.
220. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 n.28. There have been some congressional attempts
at legislation protecting whistleblowers. See Civil Serv. Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92
Stat. 1111 (1978); see also Note, The Rights of Sources--The Critical Element in the Clash over
Reporter's Privilege, 88 YALE L.J. 1202, nn. 7, 8, 42 (1979).
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The California rule in Mitchell states that if the information in a
standard civil libel suit relates to matters of great public importance, and
the risk of harm to the source is a substantial one, a court can refuse to
require disclosure even though the plaintiff has no other way of obtaining
the information.221 The court in Mitchell used a five-part test to evaluate
a claim for source disclosure:
(1) the nature of the litigation and whether the reporter is a party;
(2) the relevance of the information sought to the plaintiff's cause of
action; (3) the plaintiff's exhaustion of all alternative sources;(4) the
importance of protecting confidentiality in the case at hand; and (5) a
prima facie showing that the alleged defamatory statements are
false.222
After a case-by-ease balancing, the Mitchell court noted that the determi-
nation of the public interest in nondisclosure should be examined and
might override a strong private interest in disclosure. Thus, at this stage,
courts need to examine the public interest in the information by examin-
ing the specific contextual factors involved in a case.
In summary, disclosure should only be ordered when the plaintiff
makes a preliminary showing that falsity is a jury issue and that the iden-
tity of the source is necessary to prove actual malice. The defendant also
should bear part of the burden by refuting the possibility of actual mal-
ice. After thoroughly examining the three branches of the balancing tests
through the threshold requirements for certain relevance, the least re-
strictive alternative, and the compelling interest in disclosure, courts are
ready to consider the request in context and analyze first amendment
considerations such as any public interest in nondisclosure. Courts
should take account of special factors in the particular context, such as
the legitimacy of the source's claim for secrecy and the likely deterrent
effect of a disclosure order on that type of source in the future, as the
Court did in Branzburg. If the defendant demonstrates that great harm
and deterrence will result from a disclosure order, the public interest may
prevail over the private interest in obtaining the source's identity. The
danger of frivolous or retaliatory discovery requests will thus be miti-
gated. Information is of great public importance in an informed democ-
racy, so it is imperative to consider the potential harm to sources and the
possibility of future restricted access to information in certain contexts
before ordering disclosure of confidential sources.
221. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 283, 282-83, 690 P.2d 625, 634-35, 208 Cal. Rptr.
152, 161 (1984).
222. Id. at 283, 690 P.2d at 632-35, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159-62.
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CONCLUSION
Libel suits with the potential of million dollar judgments are bound
to have a practical chilling effect on the press' use of confidential sources.
But the exercise of first amendment freedoms may be more susceptible to
a chilling effect in certain libel contexts where confidential sources are
heavily relied upon to provide the public with important news.
The concerns in each context deserve critical scrutiny after a thor-
ough demonstration of threshold relevance, exploration of less restrictive
alternatives, and the examination of the private and public interests in-
volved. Judges need to adapt the specific analysis which the Court un-
dertook in Branzburg to other contexts as claims for disclosure arise. By
articulating a contextual analysis, courts will provide better guidance for
jurists, information sources, and journalists regarding the extent to which
the first amendment protects those who supply information on a confi-
dential basis.
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